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Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s 
need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk 
of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for 
complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is 
inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge, 
and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the 
additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time 
to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important 
predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy. 
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“The fall of Enron was a direct result of failed corporate governance and consequently has led 
to a complete reevaluation of corporate governance practice in the United States…” 
(Munzig, 2003) 
Introduction 
Since the accounting scandals of the early 21st century, ethics and corporate governance issues 
have increasingly attracted the attention of researchers, practitioners, and policy makers. 
WorldCom overstated its profits by $3.8 billion by improperly classifying expenses as 
investments. Enron, the icon of corporate fraud and corruption, moved debt off its own books 
and presented a misleading financial status. Adelphia, the fifth largest cable company in the U.S., 
collapsed into bankruptcy after it disclosed $2.3 billion in off-balance-sheet debt.  
Although corporate governance is apparently associated with the risk of bankruptcy, there 
has been only scant research on the nature of the association grounded on comprehensive 
empirical tests. The existing studies mainly deal with the link between corporate governance and 
operating performance or firm value (see Weisbach, 1987; Gilson, 1990; Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 
1998; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen, 2008; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Duchin, Matsusaka and 
Ozbas, 2010; Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa, 2010; and Masulis and Mobbs, 2011).  
However, we posit that the effect of governance is not uniform across all firms and that 
one-size-fits-all governance practices can be counter-productive. The findings from non-
bankrupt (healthy) firms, documented in the above studies, may not explain the effectiveness of 
certain governance features for situations in which firms are close to becoming financially 
distressed or bankrupt. There are at least two reasons for this difference. First, governance 
structures that are effective and useful for some firms can be ineffective and even counter-
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productive for others. For example, it appears that Enron actually incurred financial leverage to 
manipulate reported earnings and thus increased agency costs even though debt can discipline 
management by forcing it to pay out cash rather than overinvesting (Jensen, 1986). Second, firm 
performance is not a single factor directly causing bankruptcy, and bad performance may not 
necessarily lead to immediate insolvent status. Bankruptcy is associated with several conditions 
including a firm’s fixed costs (i.e., operating and financial leverage), sales sensitivity (especially 
to economic downturns), and the proportion of illiquid assets. 
There have been a number of studies that link corporate governance to the risk of 
bankruptcy (e.g., Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001; Parker, Peters, and Turetsky, 2002; and Fich and 
Slezak, 2008). However, most prior studies deal with restricted samples and examine the effects 
of some corporate governance variables without considering the potential impact of firm specific 
characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and firm’s need for specialty 
knowledge. To fill this gap in the literature, we examine the effect that these firm characteristics 
have on the relationship between corporate governance attributes (such as board size and director 
independence) and the risk of corporate bankruptcy. 
We find that a larger board is likely to reduce the probability of bankruptcy, inconsistent 
with the suggestion of some studies that larger boards can be less effective than small boards 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; and Eisenberg et al., 1998). Our results 
further suggest that the reduction in the probability of bankruptcy occurs only when complex 
firms employ larger boards (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; and Linck et al., 2008).  These 
findings imply that a larger board brings to the firm wider networks and knowledge as well as 
richer experience and expertise.  The enhanced advisory capacity of a larger board appears to be 
relatively more beneficial to more complex firms when they are under serious financial pressure.  
 4
However, we also find that larger boards are of no benefit to simpler firms, where the more 
marginal gains from additional advisory capacity seem to be offset by coordination and free-
riding problems.  
Corporate boards have two important functions – monitoring and advising. We find that 
in circumstances where relatively little specialist knowledge is required to properly understand 
the firm’s operations, firms with a greater proportion of outside directors have a lower 
probability of bankruptcy.  For these firms, the monitoring function of the board is more 
important, and our findings accord well with the view that outside directors are likely to be 
superior at this function. Conversely, we find that in situations where relatively more specialist 
knowledge is required to properly understand the firm’s operations, firms with a greater 
proportion of inside directors have a lower probability of bankruptcy. This is consistent with the 
posture that, in more technically sophisticated firms, the advisory function of the board requires 
more insiders with specialist knowledge. 
We further examine several other corporate governance attributes that have been linked 
to operating performance.  The evidence we find suggests that the majority of these variables are 
robustly related to the probability of bankruptcy.  For example, our results suggest that firms 
with more diverse boards (a greater proportion of female representation) are less likely to file for 
bankruptcy, which is consistent with studies that find a positive link between board gender 
diversification and operating performance attributable to improved monitoring (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). In addition, we find that firms with more powerful CEOs, who also serve as 
board chairman or hold a larger proportion of the firm’s stock, are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy.  This is consistent with the literature that reports a negative relationship between 
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CEO power and operating performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 
2005; and Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001).   
The results also suggest that firms that have recently replaced their CEO are less likely to 
file for bankruptcy, similar to the evidence of Bonnier and Bruner (1989) who report a 
significantly positive stock price reaction to the departure of CEOs of poorly performing firms.  
This implies that CEO departures do not have a signaling role – that there are other sources of 
information that signal the financial health of the firm and, conditional on poor financial health, 
the departure of the CEO is a positive development.  We also find a negative relationship 
between CEO tenure and the probability of bankruptcy.  Taken together, these results suggest 
that, when the CEO is not replaced, the firm is better served by a longer-standing CEO. 
Our analysis explores the marginal ability of corporate governance attributes to assist in 
the prediction of corporate bankruptcies beyond traditional bankruptcy prediction models based 
on accounting ratios and firm characteristics.  As expected, we find that firms are more likely to 
file for bankruptcy if they are less profitable, more highly leveraged, smaller, and have more 
volatile returns.  The corporate governance variables that we examine achieve significant 
explanatory power beyond the accounting ratios and firm characteristics. 
Finally, the evidence we obtained suggests that the additional explanatory power gained 
from adding corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is 
increased, suggesting that while corporate governance characteristics are important, they have a 
longer-term effect and cannot by themselves save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy. Although 
accounting ratios echo current firm performance, corporate governance factors reflect the 
framework within which the firm operates, which is likely to have an effect that plays out over a 
longer time horizon.  
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops our 
hypotheses. In the third section we discuss the data sources and sample construction.  The fourth 
section presents our empirical results, and the last section concludes. 
 
Hypotheses Development 
The main purpose of this study is to examine how the relationship between corporate governance 
and the risk of bankruptcy is affected by firm-specific characteristics such as the degree of firm 
complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge.  
The two primary functions of the board of directors are the monitoring and advisory roles.  
The independence of the board has been specifically linked to the monitoring function and the 
board size has been linked to the advisory function.  The literature focuses mainly on the 
monitoring role of the board and generally reports that an efficient internal monitoring 
mechanism reduces agency problems and improves managerial efficiency. It is also generally 
suggested that smaller boards are more efficient in the monitoring role due to better co-
ordination and less free-riding (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, and Jensen, 1993). In relation to the 
advisory role, Dalton and Daily (1999) find that large and diversified boards generally provide 
better advice to the CEO.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) report that independent directors offer 
better advice, but Duchin et al. (2010) and Coles et al. (2008) find that operating performance 
only benefits from the advice of outside directors in cases where it is relatively easier for them to 
learn more about the firm. These results suggest that there may be a trade-off between the 
monitoring role of the board (which may benefit from smaller numbers) and the board advisory 
function (which may benefit from larger numbers and greater independence in some 
circumstances).   
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A theoretical rationale behind the effect of board size on the risk of bankruptcy is that 
firms face two types of information asymmetries (endogenous vs. exogenous) and the 
mechanisms in mitigating each type of information asymmetry are different (De Groote, 1990). 
The monitoring function of the board deals with endogenous hidden information produced from 
consequent managerial decisions within the firm. In contrast, the advising function of the board 
is more likely to mitigate the exogenous hidden information that is independent of the firm 
decisions. It is plausible that both types of information asymmetry affect more complex firms, 
whereas endogenous issues are more relevant for less complex firms. We argue that large boards 
are better in solving the exogenous information asymmetry but weaker in endogenous issues. 
Therefore, large boards may function better for complex firms, while small boards are more 
efficient in solving the endogenous hidden information in simpler firms via their monitoring 
function.1 
Coles et al. (2008) contend that the literature often overlooks the advisory role of the 
board despite its profound importance in certain circumstances. They suggest that complex 
(simple) firms with larger (smaller) boards perform better due to greater (less) advisory 
requirements. This proposition receives empirical support in Boone et al. (2007) and Linck et al. 
(2008). In contrast, other studies find smaller boards to be more effective in monitoring tasks 
(e.g., Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; and Fich and Slezak, 2008). These authors argue that, unlike 
large boards with high coordination costs, smaller boards are more cohesive and have fewer free-
rider problems and are thus able to monitor more effectively. Yermack (1996) reports a negative 
relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q, while Fich and Slezak (2008) contend that 
distressed firms with smaller boards are more likely to avoid bankruptcy.  
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In summary, the literature has established a link between board size and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and further suggests that optimal board size is related to firm complexity.  We bring 
these two strands of literature together in our first hypothesis (H1), which posits that a firm is 
more likely to fail if it has a board size that is inappropriate to its circumstances:  
H1: Other things being equal, complex (simple) firms are more likely to fail if they have 
smaller (larger) boards.   
Another key feature of board composition is the degree of independence. It is generally 
presumed that boards with greater independence are more effective in performing the monitoring 
role of the board. For example, Nguyen and Nielson (2010) investigate stock price reactions to 
sudden deaths and conclude that independent directors are generally viewed as being beneficial 
to the firm.  Byrd and Hickman (1992) report that independent boards are more likely to remove 
CEOs because of poor performance and Fich and Slezak (2008) suggest that firms with more 
independent boards are better able to avoid bankruptcy after entering distress.  
However, other studies suggest that the link between board independence and the 
advisory function also depends upon the specific circumstances of the firm.  Duchin et al. (2010) 
argue that greater board independence may adversely influence the firm performance when it is 
difficult for independent directors to acquire information about the firm. Coles et al. (2008) 
report that outside directors contribute to the board advisory function if the firm has multiple 
business units or extensive relationships with external parties, but that inside directors make a 
superior contribution to the advisory function where the firm’s operations are technically more 
sophisticated and require specialist knowledge. 
In sum, in circumstances where specialist knowledge is required to properly understand 
the firm’s operations, there seems to be a trade-off between increasing board independence to 
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support the board monitoring function and increasing the proportion of insiders to support the 
board advisory function – for a given board size. 
Since bankruptcy is an indication (or an outcome) of firm performance, we postulate that, 
in circumstances where relatively little specialist knowledge is required to properly understand 
the firm’s operations, firms with a greater proportion of outside directors have a lower 
probability of bankruptcy.  For these firms, the monitoring function of the board is more 
important.  Conversely, we postulate that in circumstances where relatively more specialist 
knowledge is required to properly understand the firm’s operations, firms with a greater 
proportion of inside directors have a lower probability of bankruptcy.  The advisory function of 
the board requires more insiders with specialist knowledge in these types of firms.  We examine 
this formally through our second hypothesis: 
H2: Other things being equal, firms whose operations require more (less) specialist 
knowledge are more likely to fail if they have a smaller (greater) proportion of inside directors.        
Data and Measurement of Variables 
Data Sources and Sample Selection 
We compile our firm bankruptcies data from various sources including UCLA-LoPucki 
Bankruptcy Research Database (http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/), New Generation Research 
(www.bankruptcydata.com), Compustat, and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
The sample contains listed Compustat firms and covers a 10-year period from 1996 to 2006 
because the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) data start from 1996. Following 
prior research, we classify a firm as being bankrupt if it makes a Chapter 11 filing. We obtain 
accounting data such as firm diversification and financial ratios from Compustat, and CRSP 
provides daily and monthly data on stock returns. We hand collect most of the corporate 
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governance data of bankrupt firms from SEC.GOV text files and data for non-bankrupt firms 
from IRRC.  
Following Begley, Ming and Watts (1996), we assume that annual financial statements 
are available by the end of the fourth month after the firm’s fiscal year-end. For each bankrupt 
firm, the end of the last fiscal year must be at least four months prior to bankruptcy. If it is within 
four months, we treat the previous year’s financial statements as the last available observation.
2  We have 67,095 observations (11,511 firms) with valid accounting and market data. For 
compatibility with previous studies (e.g., Begley et al. 1996, and Shumway, 2001), we exclude 
firms with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code between 6000 and 6999 (financial 
firms). Thus, we exclude firms in the financial services and real estate sector whose financial 
structures appear quite different from the rest of the firms in our sample.3 This process results in 
14,328 observations and 2,443 firms being excluded from the sample. There are 11,116 firm year 
observations (1,972 firms) that have both corporate governance data and accounting data 
available. We exclude firms that are delisted from CRSP or deleted from Compustat for reasons 
other than bankruptcy or liquidation. We also delete firms with board size smaller than three to 
guard against possible errors in data entry (3 observations were excluded on this basis).  
The final sample includes 217 bankrupt firms with accounting and corporate governance 
data one year prior to bankruptcy.4 Among the bankrupt firms, 186 firms have data over two 
years prior to bankruptcy. For those bankrupt firms without an exact filing date, we treat their 
delisting date from CRSP or Compustat (whichever comes first) as the bankruptcy date. All 
estimations are on a yearly basis. The final sample also contains 9,100 non-bankrupt (healthy) 
firm-years excluding years for bankrupt firms.   
Accounting and Market-based Variables 
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Our base model uses constructs similar to Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) for the role of 
accounting and market-based control variables. The accounting variables reflect profitability, 
liquidity and leverage; and the market-based variables reflect past excess stock returns, 
idiosyncratic risk, firm size, market to book ratio and fiscal year end closing price.  Consistent 
with prior research, we expect that more profitable and liquid firms should exhibit a lower 
probability of bankruptcy while higher leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy. We also 
expect that larger firms with low market to book ratio, higher stock returns and lower volatility 
have a lower probability of bankruptcy. 
Firm Complexity 
Coles et al. (2008), and Linck et al. (2008) suggest that a firm’s level of complexity 
depends on three dimensions: scope of operations, size and leverage. A diversified firm tends to 
be more complex and thus requires a greater range of advice from the board of directors 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Yermack (1996) shows that more complex firms tend to have 
larger boards. Large firms are also more complex because they often have more external 
contracting relationships (Booth and Deli, 1996) and thus have greater advisory requirements 
and a need for larger boards (Pfeffer, 1972).  Klein (1998) also argues that firms with high 
leverage are likely to have greater advisory needs because they rely more on external resources. 
These contentions also find empirical support in Linck et al. (2008). Following Coles et al. 
(2008), and Linck et al. (2008), we employ a principal components analysis to produce for each 
firm-year observation a complexity score based on the number of business segments, log (sales), 
and leverage (defined as total liabilities to market value of assets). We define any firm as 
“complex” if its complexity score is above the median value, and the firm is deemed to be 
“simple” otherwise. 
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Specialty Knowledge 
Independent of firm breadth, size and leverage, the operations of some firms are more technically 
demanding thus requiring specialist knowledge, whereas other firms’ operations are more 
straightforward. Prior literature suggests two ways of measuring the cost of acquiring 
information. First, Coles et al. (2008) use R&D expenditure as a proxy for the specialist 
knowledge required to understand the firm’s operations. Second, Duchin et al. (2010) use the 
availability, homogeneity, and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts in Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) to measure the information about the firm that is available to outsiders.  
Both Coles et al. (2008) and Duchin et al. (2010) show that operating performance is positively 
related to the appointment of outsiders in firms that have low R&D and for which there are more 
consistent analyst forecasts.  These findings indicate that outside directors have a positive effect 
when it is easier to become informed about the firm’s operations.  In this paper, we follow Coles 
et al. (2008) and use R&D expenditure to measure the extent to which directors require specialist 
knowledge. In particular, we develop an R&D dummy variable that is assigned a value of 1 if the 
firm’s R&D intensity (i.e., R&D expenditures scaled by total assets) is higher than the 75 
percentile and 0 otherwise.   
Board Diversification  
Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that diversified boards in gender (consisting of both men and 
women) provide more effective monitoring that could enhance management efficiency. We 
measure board diversification by the proportion of female directors and expect that firms are 
more likely to fail if the board is less diversified in gender. 
CEO Power  
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Adams et al. (2005) argue that the volatility of stock returns is higher for firms run by powerful 
CEOs who are also either the founder of the firm or the board chairman. Daily and Dalton (1994) 
and Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) find that a duality of roles (a CEO also serving as the board 
chairman) is relatively more common in bankrupt firms. This suggests a positive relationship 
between CEO power concentration and the probability of bankruptcy. 
 We measure CEO power concentration in two ways.  First, we construct a dummy 
variable that is set to one if the CEO also serves as board chairman.  Hambrick and D’Aveni 
(1992) find that the probability of bankruptcy increases with the degree of CEO dominance. 
Daily and Dalton (1994) examine the relationship between governance structure and corporate 
bankruptcy and report that bankrupt firms are more likely to have CEOs serving simultaneously 
as the board chairman, compared to a sample of matched firms. Therefore, we expect a positive 
association between the duality of roles and the probability of bankruptcy. 
Second, we measure the proportions of the firm’s stock that are owned by the CEO 
(CEOs who own greater proportions of the firm’s stock are considered to be more powerful). 
Myers (1977) contends that equity ownership and option compensation may induce management 
to engage in value decreasing risk shifting behavior when a firm is distressed. Therefore, we 
expect a positive association between the CEO stockholding and the probability of bankruptcy. 
Management Stability 
The past literature on the relationship between bankruptcy risk and management stability suggest 
both directions. On one hand, turnover in senior management ranks is relatively more common in 
firms filing for bankruptcy or privately restructuring their debts to avoid bankruptcy. Gilson 
(1989) finds that 52% of sampled firms that file for bankruptcy experience a senior management 
change. Hambrick and D’aveni (1992) insists that poor organizational performance leads to CEO 
 14
departure, which includes voluntary departures for better rewards, voluntary departures to avoid 
stigma, and purposive attempts to modify the team. Schwartz and Menon (1985) report that 45% 
of bankrupt firms change CEOs compared to 19% of control firms. Daily and Dalton (1995) find 
that the likelihood of bankruptcy more than doubled for financially distressed firms that have 
their CEOs replaced by outsiders, relative to a matched sample of solvent firms. Parker et al. 
(2002) find that firms replacing their CEO with an outsider are more than twice as likely to 
experience bankruptcy. Therefore, this stream of the literature suggests that replacing CEOs 
might indicate firm’s unhealthy financial situation. 
On the other hand, we note that stock prices tend to react positively to the announcement 
of top management turnover in poorly performing firms (Bonnier and Bruner, 1989). This is 
consistent with the notion that the removal of incumbent managers enhances the firm’s prospects 
of being able to improve future performance.  As to bankruptcy prediction, it is unlikely that the 
departure of the CEO has a significant signaling effect in relation to the financial health of the 
firm since there are other sources of more direct information on the firm financial condition.  If 
this is the case, it is likely that, conditional on poor financial health, the departure of the CEO is a 
positive development that would reduce the probability of bankruptcy.  
We measure management stability in two ways.  First we construct a dummy variable 
that is set to one if the firm has replaced its CEO within the previous three years.  Hill and Phan 
(1991) find that CEOs with longer tenure may become too powerful, with an adverse effect on 
firm performance. Therefore, we measure the tenure of current CEOs.  Whereas a long-serving 
CEO may negatively affect the operating performance of a firm, the types of expropriation 
identified by Hill and Phan (1991) are less likely to be tolerated (or even possible) as the firm 
becomes more distressed.  Rather, as the financial performance of the firm declines, it becomes 
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more likely that its senior management will be replaced.  Given that the incumbent CEO is not 
replaced, it may be that the firm is better served by a longer-standing CEO.  Ultimately, this is an 
empirical question that we address in this paper. 
 
Empirical Results 
Summary Statistics  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all explanatory variables in the model. The mean values 
are reported in bold if they are significantly different between the bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
sub-samples at the 5% level or better. We winsorize all data on accounting and firm 
characteristics at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. One may think that distressed firms tend to 
exhibit extreme values of financial data and thus original values need to be used in the study. 
However, as addressed in Shumway (2001) among others, winsorizing data is a proper way to 
mitigate the statistical problem resulting from extreme outliers. We do not winsorize variables on 
firm diversification (the number of business segments) and corporate governance since they are 
constructed in such a manner that outliers are not an issue.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The top panel in Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the accounting variables and 
other firm characteristics. The accounting variables capture three key elements of the financial 
strength of a firm: profitability, liquidity, and leverage. Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. 
(2008) demonstrate that these variables embody useful information about bankruptcy risk.  
The profitability variables gauge the ability of the firm to generate sufficient returns to 
remain solvent. We measure profitability as the ratio of net income to the market value of total 
assets (NIMTA).  The average profitability ratio for firms that became bankrupt in the following 
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year is -0.16, whereas it is 0.02 for healthy firms. Leverage (the ratio of total liability to the 
market value of total assets, TLMTA) gauges the relative burden of debt and other firm 
obligations. On average, and as expected, bankrupt firms have considerably higher leverage 
compared to other firms in the sample. Liquidity (the ratio of cash and short-term assets to the 
market value of total assets, CASHMTA) captures the firm’s ability to meet its short-term 
obligations. Firms prior to bankruptcy display similar liquidity compared to other firms.  
Shumway (2001) argues that firms with lower excess returns and more volatile stock 
returns have higher bankruptcy risk. We measure the firm’s past excess return (EXRET) by the 
return in year t minus the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX index return in year t. The 
idiosyncratic risk (SIGMA) is the standard deviation of the residuals derived from regressing 
monthly stock returns on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX index returns in year t-1. We 
find that bankrupt firms have lower and more volatile stock returns than other firms in the 
sample. The mean and median bankrupt firm reveals substantial underperformance (lower excess 
returns) in the year prior to bankruptcy. Firms that ultimately file for bankruptcy also have, on 
average, lower stock prices, lower sales revenue, fewer business segments (less diversified), and 
higher R&D intensity. 
The bottom panel in Table 1 displays summary statistics on board structure and key CEO 
characteristics. The median board size is typically smaller for bankrupt firms (7 directors) 
compared to other firms (9 directors).  Bankrupt firms also tend to have a higher proportion of 
inside directors (median of 20% for bankrupt firms and 17% for other firms), and a smaller 
proportion of female directors (median of 0% for bankrupt firms and 9% for other firms). These 
results are consistent with previous research (e.g., Yermack, 1996 and Adams and Ferreira, 2009) 
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suggesting that firms perform better with relatively more independent directors and more 
diversified boards in gender.  
Firms that subsequently file for bankruptcy also tend to have shorter CEO tenure, are 
more likely to have changed CEO in the previous three years and to have the CEO serving as the 
chairman.  Firms that subsequently file for bankruptcy also tend to have a larger proportion of 
stocks held by the CEO, which is consistent with them being smaller firms. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of sample firms that are bankrupt within one year by 
year and Fama-French 12 industry code. We find that the bankrupt firms are not evenly 
distributed across industries. For example, among 217 bankruptcies, wholesale and retail 
industry takes 41 events over the period, 1997 to 2007, followed by business equipment industry 
(37 bankruptcies) manufacturing industry (33 bankruptcies). In contrast, only one bankruptcy is 
found from utilities during the same period. The number of bankruptcies is not fairly distributed 
by year and reaches its peak right after the dot-com bubble burst.5 
[Table 2 about here] 
The Logit Model 
Following Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), we assess the association between 
bankruptcy risk and corporate governance factors using a multi-period logit model. Since there 
are multiple observations of the same firm, we adjust standard errors for clustering following 
Petersen (2008). We measure the model fit using log-likelihood ratio tests, Pseudo 2R  and the 
Receiver Operating Characteristics area (ROC area).6  A model with a higher Pseudo 2R  and a 
larger ROC area is considered to provide a superior fit to the data.   
The multi-period logit model takes the general form: 
1
, ,(1 exp{ })
  i t i tP y  (1) 
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where tiP ,  represents the conditional probability at time t that firm i will be bankrupt within one 
year.  This probability is conditional on the observed value of tiy , , which is a linear combination 
of the explanatory and control variables.  For example, when we examine firms that file for 
bankruptcy within one year, we have: 
1, -1 1, -
, , -1
, -1 , -
...
' ' .....
...
 
        
t t j
i t i t
n t n t j
X X
y a X
X X
 (2) 
where 1,1 tX  represents the value of the first explanatory variable, observed four months after the 
end of the financial year immediately prior to bankruptcy, and so on.  That is, these models 
measure the likelihood of bankruptcy within one year conditional on the observed values of the 
explanatory and control variables. 
We also measure the ability of the explanatory and control variables to predict 
bankruptcy two years in advance, in which case the variables are measured four months after the 
end of the penultimate financial year prior to bankruptcy. 
Availability of bankruptcy data is limited, with most having only three firm-year 
observations prior to filing. Because firms often experience financial distress several years prior 
to bankruptcy, we do not include in our sample of non-bankrupt firm-years any observation for 
any firm that ultimately filed for bankruptcy. 
Board Size, Board Independence, and Bankruptcy Risk 
Table 3 reports the regression results from the logit model. In the first two columns, the 
dependent variable is set to 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy within one year, and 0 otherwise. In 
the last two columns, the dependent variable is set to 1 if the firm files for bankruptcy between 
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one and two years in the future, and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit CNUM code from CRSP (Petersen, 2008).  
[Table 3 about here] 
Model 1, which contains only accounting ratios and firm characteristics as explanatory 
variables, serves as the base model. Consistent with expectations, the results for Model 1 suggest 
that more profitable and liquid firms have a lower probability of bankruptcy and that higher 
leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy.  We also find that larger firms and firms with 
higher stock prices and lower volatility have a lower probability of bankruptcy. There is no 
relationship between stock returns and the probability of bankruptcy two years before bankruptcy, 
but higher stock returns one year prior to bankruptcy are associated with a significantly higher 
probability of bankruptcy.  This is consistent with the notion that in any given period, firms that 
generate the highest stock returns are likely to be more risky than average.  Consequently, a high 
stock return is likely to be an indication of risk, where more risky firms are more likely to 
become distressed at some point. 
 Model 2 adds key corporate governance variables – board size and insider director 
fraction. We find that the log board size variable is insignificantly different from zero, indicating 
that on average there is no relationship between board size and the probability of bankruptcy. 
However, the interaction between the log of board size and the complexity dummy variable is 
significantly negative. Thus, for complex firms, larger boards are associated with a lower 
probability of bankruptcy. This finding lends support to our first hypothesis. It is also consistent 
with the recent evidence that larger boards are associated with improved operating performance, 
but only for complex firms (Boone et al. 2007, Coles et al. 2008; and Linck et al. 2008).   
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The results for Model 2 also indicate that, on average, firms with a larger proportion of 
inside directors are more likely to subsequently file for bankruptcy.  However, the interaction 
between this variable and our measure of the technical sophistication of the firm’s operations 
(R&D intensity) is significantly negative and larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the 
proportion of inside directors itself.  This implies that a greater proportion of inside directors 
increases the probability of bankruptcy for firms with low R&D intensity, and reduces the 
probability of bankruptcy for firms with high R&D intensity. These empirical results support our 
second hypothesis.  Note further that these results also accord well with recent research on board 
composition and firm performance, which reports that boards with a lower proportion of inside 
directors are associated with improved operating performance, but only for technically 
unsophisticated firms (Coles et al. 2008; and Duchin et al. 2010). The results moreover support 
the evidence in Adams et al. (2010) as well as Masulis and Mobbs (2011) that insiders are 
beneficial to the firm. 
Table 3 also reports p-values for likelihood ratio statistics of the joint significance of our 
corporate governance variables.  The p-values reported under the Model 2 columns are for 
testing the joint significance (relative to the base Model 1) of the board size, inside director 
variables, and the interaction terms.  As shown in Table 3, the corporate governance variables 
proved jointly highly significant. 
Other Corporate Governance Characteristics and Bankruptcy Risk 
In the following tests, we explore the effects of other corporate governance variables such as 
female director fraction, CEO/chairman duality, CEO shareholding, turnover, and tenure.  
Results in Table 4 indicate that, on average, bankruptcy is less likely for firms with a higher 
proportion of female directors. The estimated coefficient of female director fraction is significant 
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at the 10% level in the test for two year prior to bankruptcy. This evidence accords well with 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) who report that more diversified boards improve operating 
performance. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 further suggests that bankruptcy is more likely when the CEO serves as board 
chairman.  This finding is consistent with our postulate that CEO power is positively related to 
the probability of bankruptcy. The results also suggest that bankruptcy is less likely when the 
CEO has been replaced within the previous three years (achieves significance only one year prior 
to bankruptcy) and that bankruptcy is negatively related to CEO tenure.  These results accord 
with Bonnier and Bruner (1989) who report a significantly positive stock price reaction to the 
departure of CEOs of poorly performing firms.  These findings imply that CEO departures do not 
have a signaling role, that there are other sources of information on the financial health of the 
firm and, conditional on poor financial health, the departure of the CEO reduces the probability 
of bankruptcy.  Therefore, it appears beneficial to remove a poorly-performing CEO. However, 
when the CEO is not removed (for whatever reason) bankruptcy becomes less likely if the firm is 
managed by a longer-standing CEO.7,8 
Table 5 displays the results from estimating regressions that include a complete set of the 
governance variables. We find that most governance variables are jointly highly significant. The 
p-values reported for testing the joint significance (relative to Model 1 of Table 3) are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
[Table 5 about here] 
The contribution of the corporate governance variables is relatively greater two years 
prior to bankruptcy compared to the year immediately preceding it.  The statistical significance 
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of the corporate governance coefficients is almost uniformly higher two years prior to 
bankruptcy and the likelihood ratio test statistic is more than double the corresponding value in 
the year prior to bankruptcy. Furthermore, in the year before bankruptcy, adding the corporate 
governance variables increases the pseudo R-squared statistic by only 9.7% (from 0.557 for 
Model 1 in Table 3 to 0.611 for Model 2 in Table 5).  Two years before bankruptcy, the addition 
of the corporate governance variables increases the pseudo R-squared statistic by 18.5%, (from 
0.379 for Model 3 in Table 3 to 0.449 for Model 4 in Table 5). In contrast, the statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the accounting ratio and firm characteristic variables in the 
base model are almost uniformly lower two years prior to bankruptcy. This suggests that the 
additional explanatory power gained from adding corporate governance variables becomes larger 
as the time to bankruptcy increases.  Furthermore, the relative importance of the accounting 
ratios decreases and the relative importance of the corporate governance variables increases with 
the time to bankruptcy.  Thus, while corporate governance attributes are important, they have a 
“longer-term” effect and cannot by themselves save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy. 
The results with additional governance variables in Models 2 and 4 reveal that firms are 
less likely to be bankrupt if CEOs have more option value relative to total compensation, if 
insiders and institutional blockholders own fewer shares, and if audit committee is independent.9 
Prediction Success Rates 
Figure 1 reports the sum of Type I and Type II errors from the models in the previous tables. The 
figure shows the sum of Type I errors (classifying a bankrupt firm as healthy) and Type II errors 
(classifying a healthy firm as bankrupt) according to the predicted values computed from each 
model. As expected, prediction accuracy declines with the length of the prediction horizon and 
the sum of Type I and Type II errors is higher for predictions made two years prior to bankruptcy.  
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Consistent with previous results, the relative improvement from adding corporate governance 
variables is greater two years prior to bankruptcy than it is one year prior. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Robustness Tests 
We test the robustness of our results in various ways.  First, we provide additional tests for the 
key variables (firm complexity and specialty knowledge) by using diverse cutoff values and by 
constructing them in different manners. In previous tests, we consider a firm as complex if its 
complexity score is above the median value, and the firm is deemed to be simple otherwise. In 
Table 6, we define the firm as being complex only if its complexity score is above the 75 
percentile. Similarly, we previously defined a firm to be R&D intensive if its R&D score is 
above the 75 percentile. In Table 6, we examine the robustness of our results to the case where 
we define any firm with an R&D score above the median as R&D intensive.10 
Table 7 measures firm complexity using the business segment assets-based Herfindahl 
Index calculated as the ratio of the sum of squared segment assets to the squared value of total 
assets. This index decreases when the firm is more diversified and consequently more complex. 
We also change the proxy for specialty knowledge, using patent citation information obtained 
from the patent citation data supplied by the National Bureau Economic Research.11 We use the 
median values to generate a complexity dummy (taking a value of 1 if the Herfindahl Index is 
below the median) and a specialty knowledge dummy (taking a value of 1 if the patent citation 
score is above the median). We further examine the robustness of our results to the case where 
firms are having Herfindahl scores in the bottom quartile, and where firms are said to require 
specialist knowledge only if their patent citation score is in the top quartile.  
 24
These alternative results are all qualitatively similar to those reported in the previous 
table. Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven by specific cutoff values or by the 
particular methods used to measure firm complexity and specialty knowledge.  
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
Second, we perform a matched pairs analysis where each bankrupt firm is matched with a 
non-bankrupt firm on the basis of firm’s total assets and two digits SIC industry classification 
code measured two years prior to bankruptcy. We perform the same logit analysis, but on the 
matched pairs sub-sample.  This is designed to test the sensitivity of our analysis to the 
possibility that non-bankrupt firms in our larger sample systematically differ from the bankrupt 
firms in a way that distorts the coefficient estimates.  
Table 8 reports the results from the matched pairs logit analysis. As expected, more 
profitable firms with less leverage are less likely to file for bankruptcy.  More volatile and 
smaller firms have a higher probability of bankruptcy, other things being equal. Consistent with 
the results in other tables, board size is unrelated to the probability of bankruptcy, on average, 
but larger boards reduce the probability of bankruptcy for more complex firms.  However, results 
in Table 8 do not clearly support the presence of significant relationships between the probability 
of bankruptcy and the interaction of the proportion of inside directors to the technical 
sophistication of the firm’s operations.  
Consistent with Table 4, and similar to Adams and Ferreira (2009), more diversified 
boards with a higher proportion of female directors have a lower probability of bankruptcy.  The 
other corporate governance variables are not consistently and individually significant in this 
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smaller sample.  However, as the results in Tables 3 and 5 suggest, the likelihood ratio test 
statistics indicate that corporate governance variables are jointly significant. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Also, similar to the original results, the matched-pair analysis suggests that the 
contribution of the corporate governance variables is relatively greater two years prior to 
bankruptcy than it is in the year immediately preceding bankruptcy.  For example, in the year 
before bankruptcy, adding the corporate governance variables increases the pseudo R-squared 
statistic by 13.7% (from 0.620 to 0.705).  Two years prior to bankruptcy, the addition of the 
corporate governance variables improves the same statistic by 18.8% (from 0.478 to 0.568).  
These results confirm our previous conclusion that the relative importance of the accounting 
ratios decreases, while the relative importance of the corporate governance variables increases 
with the time to bankruptcy.  
In the third round of our robustness checks, we consider an issue related to cause and 
effect between corporate governance and bankruptcy. We have thus far showed that corporate 
governance variables are important predictors of bankruptcy. However, as discussed in Gilson 
(1989), many firms experience a senior management change when they are financially distressed. 
In addition, he shows that the turnover rate for non-financially-distressed firms significantly 
drops although these firms are extremely unprofitable. Therefore, it is also plausible to speculate 
that a firm’s financial status can also affect management turnover and corporate governance. To 
operationalize this issue, we use corporate governance variables from year t-1 or year t-2 (i.e., 
two years or three years prior to bankruptcy) to estimate bankruptcy in year t+1. We report the 
results from the restricted sample in Table 9. We find that the main relationships reported in the 
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previous tables are qualitatively similar even after we exclude firms whose management could 
have been affected by the possibility of bankruptcy. 12 
[Table 9 about here] 
In the final robustness check, we attempt to mitigate any potential problem of 
multicollinearity by using principal components analysis to examine the variation of bankruptcy 
prediction power from accounting and firm characteristic variables on the one hand, and from 
corporate governance variables on the other. As is common in the corporate governance 
literature (e.g., Boone et al. 2007; Coles et al. 2008; and Linck et al. 2008), the principal 
components method identifies (normalized) linear combinations of the variables that explain 
maximum portions of the variance in firms’ financial and corporate governance variables. We 
use this method to construct a single accounting factor to represent all accounting and other firm 
characteristics variables, and another corporate governance factor to collectively represent the 
corporate governance variables.  A higher score for either factor indicates a lower probability of 
bankruptcy.  Figure 2 plots the average value of each factor for non-bankrupt firms in Panel A 
and for bankrupt firms in Panel B.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
In Figure 2a, the horizontal axis represents the eleven years of our sample, 1996-2006.  
The plot indicates that on average the accounting factor for non-bankrupt firms declines during 
the early years and then ascends in the later period.  This seems consistent with the behavior of 
the U.S. economy during these two sub-periods. However, the corporate governance factor for 
non-bankrupt firms exhibits little variations, remaining largely stable over the entire period.  
The horizontal axis in Figure 2b represents years relative to bankruptcy.  For example, 
the values for each factor at time -1 are the average values of the factor across the 208 firms for 
 27
which we have data one year prior to bankruptcy.  The values at time -2 are the averages across 
the 186 firms for which we have the necessary data two years prior to bankruptcy and so on. The 
plot in Figure 2b shows that the value of the accounting factor for firms that ultimately file for 
bankruptcy deteriorates dramatically in the years prior to bankruptcy.  By contrast, there is much 
less variation in the corporate governance factor.  For several years prior to bankruptcy, the 
corporate governance factor is substantially lower for firms that ultimately file for bankruptcy 
than for those that do not.  These results are consistent with the conclusions from previous tables 
that the relative importance of the accounting ratios decreases while the relative importance of 
the corporate governance variables increases with the time to bankruptcy.  Although the 
corporate governance factor offers some discriminatory power in the year preceding bankruptcy, 
the gain is rather small relative to the accounting information factor. As the time to bankruptcy 
increases, the discriminatory power of the corporate governance factor is maintained, whereas 
the power of the accounting factor is reduced.  Consequently, the effects of the corporate 
governance variables are relatively more important when the firm’s financial position has not 
deteriorated to the extent where bankruptcy is imminent.      
We extend our analysis further by estimating the models with the principal components 
factors (rather than using the individual explanatory variables) in a multi-period logit context. 
Models 1 and 2 predict bankruptcy 1 year prior to the event; Models 3 and 4 do the same 2 years 
prior to bankruptcy, and Models 5 and 6 predict bankruptcy 3 years prior. Models 1, 3, and 5 are 
estimated with only the accounting factor and Models 2, 4, and 6 are estimated with both 
accounting and corporate governance factors. Table 10 displays the results. We gauge model 
performance by the ROC and Pseudo R2, and measure the significance of the various models 
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using likelihood ratio test statistics. We calculate the t-statistics using robust standard errors 
adjusted for firm clustering.  
The results in Table 10 suggest that both principle component factors are negatively 
associated with the probability of bankruptcy. Importantly, the coefficient magnitudes of the 
accounting factor become smaller when we predict bankruptcy earlier. We find a distinctly 
different pattern from the corporate governance factor. The estimated coefficients increase in 
magnitude when making bankruptcy prediction further away from the event. Moreover, the 
results indicate that adding corporate governance structure does improve the model performance 
and the overall bankruptcy prediction and, once again, the improvement is more substantial when 
firms are further away from bankruptcy. 
[Table 10 about here] 
These findings are consistent with our earlier conclusion that corporate governance 
structure improves bankruptcy prediction especially when firms are several years away from 
bankruptcy filing. On the contrary, accounting ratios can distinguish between healthy and 
bankrupt firms but only much closer to bankruptcy.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the association between corporate governance and bankruptcy risk. It 
explores the ability of corporate governance attributes to predict the risk of bankruptcy beyond 
traditional bankruptcy prediction models based on accounting ratios and firm characteristics. 
Although corporate governance is known to be an important factor in predicting bankruptcy, the 
nature of the relationship between governance and bankruptcy has not been thoroughly examined 
in the literature. Our study contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of 
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the effects that firm characteristic, specifically the degree of firm complexity and firm’s need for 
specialty knowledge, have on the relationship between corporate governance and the probability 
of bankruptcy. 
We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy, contrary to several 
previous studies. However, this reduction is only significant for complex firms.  The results 
suggest that having a greater proportion of inside directors reduces the risk of bankruptcy in 
firms that require more specialist knowledge, and that the reverse is true in technically 
unsophisticated firms.  We further find that bankruptcy is more likely when the board is less 
diversified in gender, when the CEO has more power, and when poorly-performing management 
teams are left in place.   
Our results further suggest that the additional explanatory power gained from corporate 
governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that 
while corporate governance variables are important, they have a longer-term effect so that 
governance changes are unlikely to be able to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy. The 
evidence from our principal components analysis indicates that firms that ultimately file for 
bankruptcy suffer from relatively poor corporate governance structures well before the 
bankruptcy event. An interesting issue for future research is whether firms entering financial 
distress adjust their corporate governance structure to avoid bankruptcy. 
In summary, our findings broadly imply some difficulty for regulators attempting to 
propose a standardized board composition since the optimal board structure varies across 
different types of firms and also across time. Nevertheless, the results indicate that poor 
corporate governance does provide an early signal for bankruptcy, which is particularly useful 
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for regulators and policy-makers. Corporate governance practices may also benefit investors in 
their attempt to identify at an early stage firms under financial distress. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 
Non-bankruptcies (N=9,100) 
Bankruptcies 
 Bankrupt in one year (N=217) Bankrupt in two years (N=186) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics 
NIMTA 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.16 -0.09 0.17 -0.07 -0.02 0.13 
TLMTA 0.34 0.31 0.21 0.68 0.76 0.24 0.56 0.63 0.27 
CASHMTA 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.10 
EXRET 0.06 0.00 0.46 -0.39 -0.55 0.52 -0.14 -0.36 0.68 
SIGMA 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.20 0.18 0.09 
SIZE -8.66 -8.80 1.53 -11.76 -11.94 1.40 -11.20 -11.27 1.52 
MB 0.95 0.87 0.73 0.24 0.07 1.10 0.49 0.31 1.08 
PRICE 3.27 3.36 0.73 1.28 1.12 0.96 1.85 1.81 1.01 
SEGMENTS 6.32 4.00 5.11 3.43 2.00 3.47 4.39 3.00 3.64 
SALES ($billions) 4760 1432 11143 1618 285 7400 1486 290 4324 
R&D 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.14 
Corporate governance factors 
Board size 9.25 9.00 2.52 7.46 7.00 2.24 7.60 7.00 2.45 
Insider director fraction 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.14 
Outsider 0.66 0.67 0.17 0.57 0.57 0.20 0.54 0.57 0.20 
Female director fraction 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.08 
CEO/Chairman duality 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.49 
CEO shareholding (%) 2.14 0.27 5.69 3.81 0.35 8.78 4.98 0.60 10.50 
CEO turnover 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.41 0.00 0.49 
CEO tenure 8.28 6.00 7.49 6.24 5.00 5.42 6.48 5.00 5.02 
CEO age 55.59 56.00 7.30 52.81 54.00 8.02 53.02 53.00 8.50 
CEO option value / total compensation 0.52 0.57 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.32 0.23 0.00 0.32 
Insider shareholding (%) 6.37 1.59 13.21 16.94 8.06 23.32 16.02 7.33 20.87 
Institutional blockholding (%) 16.09 14.37 13.18 24.06 19.73 21.71 22.32 19.64 19.27 
Independent audit committee dummy 0.63 1.00 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.50 
 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for all variables over the period 1996 to 2006. The sample contains 217 bankruptcies (186 bankruptcies 
with 2 years of prior data) and 9,100 non-bankrupt firm year observations. NIMTA = the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets; TLMTA 
= the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets; CASHMTA = the ratio of cash and short-term assets to the market value of total assets; 
EXRET = cumulative annual return in year t minus the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX return in year t; SIGMA = standard deviation of the 
residual derived from regressing monthly stock return on market return in year t; SIZE = log of the ratio of firm’s market capitalization to the total 
market capitalization of all firms; MB = the ratio of market value equity to book value equity; PRICE = log of closing price at end of previous fiscal 
year; SEGMENTS = the number of business segments in the firm; SALES = the amount of gross sales; R&D = the ratio of research development 
expenditures to total assets; Board size = the number of directors; Inside director fraction = proportion of inside directors; Female director fraction = 
proportion of female directors; CEO/Chairman duality =1 if CEO is also the Board Chairman; CEO shareholding (%) = the percentage of shares held by 
CEO, excluding option and warrants; CEO turnover =1 if there has been a CEO turnover within the previous three years; CEO tenure = the tenure of 
CEO in years; CEO age = the age of CEO; CEO option value / total compensation = the ratio of CEO option value to total compensation; Insider 
shareholding (%) = the percentage of shares held by inside directors; Institutional blockholding (%) = the percentage of shares held by institutional 
block holders; Independent audit committee dummy = 1 if the audit committee is composed of all outside directors. 
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Table 2. Distribution of sample firms bankrupt within one year 
 
Fama-French 
12 Industries Industry description 
Year 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
1 Consumer Nondurables 0 2 1 3 5 4 1 3 0 0 0 19 
  (0.0%) (25.0%) (6.7%) (9.4%) (10.4%) (11.1%) (3.3%) (15.0%) (0.0%) (0.0% (0.0%) (8.8%) 
2 Consumer Durables 0 0 2 2 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 10 
  (0.0%) (0.0%) (13.3%) (6.3%) (2.1%) (2.8%) (10.0%) (5.0%) (0.0%) (0.0% (0.0%) (4.6%) 
3 Manufacturing 1 1 2 8 7 2 4 3 3 1 1 33 
  (100.0%) (12.5%) (13.3%) (25.0%) (14.6%) (5.6%) (13.3%) (15.0%) (20.0%) (14.3% (20.0%) (15.2%) 
4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 0 0 2 1 0 0 2  0 0 0 5 
  (0.0%) (0.0%) (13.3%) (3.1%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (6.7%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0% (0.0%) (2.3%) 
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 7 
  (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (6.3%) (5.6%) (6.7%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0% (0.0%) (3.2%) 
6 Business Equipment 0 0 2 3 11 8 7 2 2 2 0 37 
  (0.0%) (0.0%) (13.3%) (9.4%) (22.9%) (22.2%) (23.3%) (10.0%) (13.3%) (28.6% (0.0%) (17.1%) 
7 Telephone and Television Transmission 0 2 1 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 8 
  (0.0%) (25.0%) (6.7%) (0.0%) (6.3%) (0.0%) (3.3%) (5.0%) (0.0%) (0.0% (0.0%) (3.7%) 
8 Utilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
  (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (3.3%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0% (0.0%) (0.5%) 
9 Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 0 3 2 3 11 5 3 7 3 2 2 41 
  (0.0%) (37.5%) (13.3%) (9.4%) (22.9%) (13.9%) (10.0%) (35.0%) (20.0%) (28.6%) (40.0%) (18.9%) 
10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 0 0 1 2 1 5 2 0 1 1 0 13 
  (0.0%) (0.0%) (6.7%) (6.3%) (2.1%) (13.9%) (6.7%) (0.0%) (6.7%) (14.3%) (0.0%) (6.0%) 
11 Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - 
              
12 Other industries 0 0 2 10 6 9 4 3 6 1 2 43 
  (0.0%) (0.0%) (13.3%) (31.3%) (12.5%) (25.0%) (13.3%) (15.0%) (40.0%) (14.3%) (40.0%) (19.8%) 
Total  1 8 15 32 48 36 30 20 15 7 5 217 
  (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%) 
 
Notes: This table presents the distribution of sample firms bankrupt within one year by industry and year. The information on Fama-French 12 industry classifications is extracted from Kenneth 
French web site at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. The percentages are reported in parentheses for each year.
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Table 3. Board Size, Board Independence, and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics     
NIMTA -1.52* -1.64* 0.74 0.55 
 (-1.71) (-1.82) (0.75) (0.54) 
TLMTA 3.77*** 5.21*** 2.53*** 3.93*** 
 (5.89) (6.66) (4.43) (5.40) 
CASHMTA -1.80 -2.30* -2.15* -2.51* 
 (-1.45) (-1.74) (-1.67) (-1.85) 
EXRET -0.51** -0.42* -0.17 -0.10 
 (-2.04) (-1.71) (-0.98) (-0.58) 
SIGMA 6.60*** 6.63*** 8.82*** 8.74*** 
 (4.59) (4.51) (6.72) (6.49) 
SIZE -0.92*** -0.75*** -1.08*** -0.89*** 
 (-7.38) (-5.78) (-7.97) (-6.35) 
MB 0.55*** 0.67*** 0.60*** 0.68*** 
 (3.97) (4.54) (4.15) (4.55) 
PRICE -0.45** -0.50** -0.08 -0.15 
 (-2.05) (-2.19) (-0.36) (-0.65) 
Corporate Governance Variables     
Log of board size  0.39  0.17 
  (0.75)  (0.35) 
Log of board size*complexity dummy  -0.89***  -0.76*** 
  (-4.61)  (-4.48) 
Insider director fraction  1.53  2.06*** 
  (1.58)  (2.70) 
Insider director fraction*high R&D dummy  -2.83**  -3.02** 
  (-2.06)  (-2.46) 
Intercept -15.18*** -13.55*** -16.93*** -14.85*** 
 (-8.45) (-6.03) (-9.16) (-6.77) 
No. of bankruptcies 217 217 186 186 
No. of healthy firm years 9100 9100 8358 8358 
Likelihood ratio test (p value)  <0.01  <0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.557 0.572 0.379 0.401 
 
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from multi-period logit bankruptcy prediction models. LRT is the likelihood 
ratio test statistics between models 1 and 2. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 1 for the variable descriptions. The t-values reported 
in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit CNUM code (firm ID from CRSP). ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Board Gender Diversity, CEO Characteristics, and Bankruptcy Risk 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics       
NIMTA -1.54* -1.62* -1.50* 0.65 0.49 0.85 
 (-1.74) (-1.82) (-1.69) (0.66) (0.49) (0.85) 
TLMTA 3.83*** 3.65*** 3.82*** 2.64*** 2.36*** 2.57*** 
 (5.98) (5.64) (5.93) (4.50) (4.12) (4.51) 
CASHMTA -1.78 -1.77 -1.83 -2.15* -2.15* -2.08* 
 (-1.44) (-1.41) (-1.50) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.66) 
EXRET -0.50** -0.52** -0.51** -0.16 -0.15 -0.17 
 (-2.04) (-2.09) (-2.02) (-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.99) 
SIGMA 6.52*** 6.54*** 6.71*** 8.71*** 8.85*** 8.93*** 
 (4.55) (4.49) (4.57) (6.66) (6.71) (6.79) 
SIZE -0.89*** -0.93*** -0.92*** -1.04*** -1.04*** -1.08*** 
 (-7.04) (-7.21) (-7.31) (-7.59) (-7.33) (-8.02) 
MB 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 
 (3.88) (3.85) (3.87) (3.98) (3.93) (4.09) 
PRICE -0.46** -0.46** -0.44** -0.08 -0.12 -0.05 
 (-2.08) (-2.08) (-1.97) (-0.38) (-0.53) (-0.25) 
Corporate Governance Variables       
Female director fraction -2.12   -2.73*   
 (-1.45)   (-1.96)   
CEO/Chairman duality  0.37   0.45**  
  (1.62)   (2.21)  
CEO shareholding (%)  0.01   0.02  
  (0.42)   (1.58)  
CEO turnover   -0.50*   -0.19 
   (-1.84)   (-0.78) 
CEO tenure   -0.06**   -0.05** 
   (-2.52)   (-2.48) 
Intercept -14.76*** -15.37*** -14.64*** -16.44*** -16.69*** -16.64*** 
 (-8.11) (-8.41) (-8.08) (-8.74) (-8.61) (-9.08) 
No. of bankruptcies 217 217 217 186 186 186 
No. of healthy firm years 9100 9100 9100 8358 8358 8358 
Pseudo R2 0.559 0.559 0.561 0.382 0.385 0.383 
 
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from multi-period logit bankruptcy prediction models. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 
1 for the variable descriptions. The t-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-
digit CNUM code (firm ID from CRSP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Complete multi-period logit results 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics     
NIMTA -1.85** -1.93** 0.43 0.53 
 (-2.03) (-2.01) (0.42) (0.51) 
TLMTA 5.04*** 5.22*** 3.73*** 4.04*** 
 (6.33) (6.41) (5.07) (5.57) 
CASHMTA -2.17* -1.44 -2.35* -1.71 
 (-1.68) (-1.04) (-1.83) (-1.26) 
EXRET -0.40 -0.43 -0.09 -0.13 
 (-1.61) (-1.63) (-0.54) (-0.78) 
SIGMA 6.50*** 6.92*** 8.94*** 9.28*** 
 (4.29) (4.35) (6.66) (6.80) 
SIZE -0.76*** -0.47*** -0.87*** -0.62*** 
 (-5.60) (-3.41) (-5.97) (-4.37) 
MB 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 
 (4.18) (3.78) (3.97) (3.70) 
PRICE -0.50** -0.66*** -0.15 -0.21 
 (-2.27) (-2.74) (-0.65) (-0.96) 
Corporate Governance Variables     
Log of board size 0.64 0.53 0.54 0.44 
 (1.17) (0.93) (1.11) (0.87) 
Log of board size*complexity dummy -0.86*** -0.87*** -0.76*** -0.78*** 
 (-4.33) (-4.07) (-4.41) (-4.38) 
Insider director fraction 2.01* 1.48 2.35*** 1.77** 
 (1.87) (1.27) (2.70) (2.01) 
Insider director fraction*high R&D dummy -2.99** -2.34* -3.00** -2.55** 
 (-2.18) (-1.77) (-2.38) (-2.12) 
Female director fraction -1.81 -1.79 -2.61* -2.55* 
 (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.84) (-1.87) 
CEO/Chairman duality 0.49** 0.51** 0.62*** 0.68*** 
 (2.08) (2.15) (2.96) (3.24) 
CEO shareholding (%) 0.01 -0.01 0.03* 0.01 
 (0.70) (-0.62) (1.85) (0.85) 
CEO turnover -0.46* -0.39 -0.09 0.02 
 (-1.70) (-1.36) (-0.36) (0.07) 
CEO tenure -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (-2.96) (-2.66) (-3.30) (-3.09) 
Log of CEO age  -0.45  -0.56 
  (-0.56)  (-0.79) 
CEO option value / total compensation  -1.87***  -1.96*** 
  (-4.35)  (-4.90) 
Insider shareholding (%)  0.02**  0.01 
  (2.25)  (0.97) 
Institutional blockholdings (%)  0.02***  0.01** 
  (2.70)  (2.23) 
Independent audit committee dummy  -0.53**  -0.66*** 
  (-2.21)  (-3.25) 
Intercept -13.59*** -7.90** -15.10*** -9.37*** 
 (-5.86) (-2.14) (-6.57) (-2.73) 
No. of bankruptcies 217 216 186 186 
No. of healthy firm years 9100 9079 8358 8340 
Likelihood ratio test (p value) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.582 0.611 0.419 0.449 
 
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from multi-period logit bankruptcy prediction models. LRT is the likelihood 
ratio test statistics between the reported model and model 2 of Table 3. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 1 for the variable 
descriptions. The t-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit 
CNUM code (firm ID from CRSP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Alternative cutoffs for complexity and high R&D dummies 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics       
NIMTA -1.67* -1.70* -2.00** 0.38 0.26 0.32 
 (-1.82) (-1.83) (-1.99) (0.38) (0.27) (0.31) 
TLMTA 6.02*** 5.77*** 5.48*** 3.75*** 3.44*** 3.51*** 
 (7.33) (6.82) (6.39) (5.30) (4.85) (4.97) 
CASHMTA -1.58 -1.41 -0.77 -1.90 -1.74 -1.02 
 (-1.22) (-1.11) (-0.58) (-1.46) (-1.41) (-0.78) 
EXRET -0.42 -0.42 -0.46* -0.08 -0.07 -0.13 
 (-1.64) (-1.58) (-1.66) (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.72) 
SIGMA 6.79*** 6.67*** 7.12*** 9.06*** 9.12*** 9.58*** 
 (4.42) (4.30) (4.32) (6.60) (6.76) (6.97) 
SIZE -0.73*** -0.73*** -0.48*** -0.92*** -0.91*** -0.68*** 
 (-5.50) (-5.25) (-3.37) (-6.53) (-6.16) (-4.74) 
MB 0.53*** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.58*** 0.51*** 0.47*** 
 (3.52) (3.24) (2.96) (3.71) (3.21) (2.92) 
PRICE -0.47** -0.50** -0.63** -0.13 -0.14 -0.19 
 (-2.07) (-2.23) (-2.56) (-0.59) (-0.64) (-0.85) 
Corporate Governance Variables       
Log of board size 0.17 0.35 0.13 -0.14 0.18 -0.04 
 (0.33) (0.65) (0.25) (-0.29) (0.37) (-0.08) 
Log of board size*Complexity dummy (=1 if complexity 
score > 75th percentile and 0 otherwise) 
-0.79*** -0.72*** -0.62*** -0.40*** -0.35*** -0.29** 
(-5.79) (-5.27) (-4.38) (-3.38) (-3.00) (-2.41) 
Insider director fraction 1.45 1.71 1.42 2.32*** 2.47** 1.86* 
 (1.49) (1.58) (1.25) (2.83) (2.52) (1.94) 
Insider fraction*High R&D dummy (=1 if R&D 
intensity > 50th percentile and 0 otherwise) 
-2.80*** -2.85*** -2.81*** -2.26** -2.25** -1.96** 
(-2.83) (-2.85) (-2.86) (-2.39) (-2.33) (-2.15) 
Female director fraction  -2.18 -1.75  -2.89** -2.74** 
  (-1.46) (-1.18)  (-2.05) (-2.00) 
CEO/Chairman duality  0.49** 0.48**  0.65*** 0.68*** 
  (2.03) (2.01)  (3.00) (3.20) 
CEO shareholding (%)  0.01 -0.01  0.03** 0.01 
  (0.96) (-0.73)  (2.01) (0.82) 
CEO turnover  -0.44 -0.40  -0.10 -0.03 
  (-1.61) (-1.41)  (-0.41) (-0.12) 
CEO tenure  -0.07*** -0.07***  -0.07*** -0.07*** 
  (-2.64) (-2.61)  (-2.97) (-3.06) 
Log of CEO age  -0.16 -0.08  -0.28 -0.37 
  (-0.20) (-0.10)  (-0.38) (-0.51) 
CEO option value / total compensation   -1.78***   -1.98*** 
   (-4.19)   (-4.90) 
Insider shareholding (%)   0.02***   0.01 
   (2.65)   (1.11) 
Institutional blockholdings (%)   0.02***   0.01* 
   (2.62)   (1.83) 
Independent audit committee dummy   -0.41*   -0.64*** 
   (-1.69)   (-3.14) 
Intercept -13.84*** -12.89*** -9.56** -15.45*** -14.43*** -10.52*** 
 (-6.03) (-3.30) (-2.49) (-7.00) (-4.06) (-3.01) 
No. of bankruptcies 217 216 216 186 186 186 
No. of healthy firm years 9100 9079 9079 8358 8340 8340 
Likelihood ratio test (p value) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.580 0.589 0.614 0.400 0.418 0.447 
 
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from multi-period logit bankruptcy prediction models with alternative cutoffs for 
complexity and high R&D dummies. LRT is the likelihood ratio test statistics between the reported model and model 2 of Table 3. Refer to 
Table 1 and Appendix 1 for the variable descriptions. The t-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the six-digit CNUM code (firm ID from CRSP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Alternative measures of complexity and specialty knowledge 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics         
NIMTA -1.75* -1.87* -1.80** -1.93* 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.13 
 (-1.95) (-1.89) (-1.96) (-1.92) (0.20) (0.14) (0.22) (0.13) 
TLMTA 4.12*** 4.23*** 4.12*** 4.27*** 2.91*** 2.99*** 2.93*** 3.04*** 
 (5.85) (5.52) (5.85) (5.67) (4.44) (4.45) (4.49) (4.56) 
CASHMTA -1.60 -0.62 -1.61 -0.61 -2.08 -1.09 -2.08 -1.07 
 (-1.22) (-0.45) (-1.22) (-0.45) (-1.55) (-0.81) (-1.53) (-0.79) 
EXRET -0.40 -0.38 -0.39 -0.37 -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 -0.12 
 (-1.57) (-1.43) (-1.52) (-1.37) (-0.60) (-0.79) (-0.47) (-0.64) 
SIGMA 6.34*** 6.83*** 6.42*** 6.96*** 8.86*** 9.53*** 8.87*** 9.57*** 
 (4.37) (4.37) (4.43) (4.47) (6.47) (6.91) (6.47) (6.95) 
SIZE -0.85*** -0.56*** -0.83*** -0.54*** -0.99*** -0.74*** -0.98*** -0.73*** 
 (-6.14) (-3.81) (-5.98) (-3.63) (-6.98) (-5.08) (-6.88) (-5.00) 
MB 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.55*** 0.47*** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.57*** 0.46*** 
 (3.62) (2.97) (3.63) (3.03) (3.59) (2.84) (3.58) (2.83) 
PRICE -0.44* -0.61** -0.45* -0.62** -0.09 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 
 (-1.90) (-2.39) (-1.93) (-2.45) (-0.41) (-0.60) (-0.49) (-0.67) 
Corporate Governance Variables         
Log of board size -0.08 -0.15 -0.18 -0.22 -0.15 -0.03 -0.22 -0.07 
 (-0.15) (-0.28) (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.33) (-0.07) (-0.48) (-0.16) 
Insider director fraction 1.31 1.15 1.39 1.24 1.90** 1.36 1.92** 1.33 
 (1.34) (0.99) (1.44) (1.07) (2.14) (1.36) (2.16) (1.32) 
Log of board size*Alternative complexity (=1 if 
Herfindahl Index < 50th percentile and 0 otherwise) 
-0.25** -0.19   -0.27** -0.24**   
(-2.17) (-1.57)   (-2.46) (-2.14)   
Insider fraction*Alternative specialty knowledge (=1 
if patent citation > 50th percentile and 0 otherwise) 
-1.74 -1.31   -2.45** -2.18*   
(-1.48) (-1.05)   (-2.21) (-1.89)   
Log of board size*Alternative complexity (=1 if 
Herfindahl Index < 25th percentile and 0 otherwise) 
  -0.29*** -0.27**   -0.31*** -0.31*** 
  (-2.58) (-2.16)   (-2.80) (-2.61) 
Insider fraction*Alternative specialty knowledge (=1 
if patent citation > 75th percentile and 0 otherwise) 
  -2.94** -2.73*   -2.58** -2.34* 
  (-2.18) (-1.81)   (-1.97) (-1.71) 
Female director fraction  -1.55  -1.72  -2.91**  -3.02** 
  (-0.99)  (-1.08)  (-1.96)  (-2.00) 
CEO/Chairman duality  0.46*  0.46*  0.63***  0.63*** 
  (1.90)  (1.87)  (2.92)  (2.91) 
CEO shareholding (%)  -0.03  -0.03  0.01  0.01 
  (-1.32)  (-1.33)  (0.63)  (0.69) 
CEO turnover  -0.54*  -0.56*  -0.05  -0.07 
  (-1.88)  (-1.94)  (-0.19)  (-0.28) 
CEO tenure  -0.07**  -0.07**  -0.07***  -0.07*** 
  (-2.47)  (-2.49)  (-3.14)  (-3.16) 
Log of CEO age  -0.22  -0.19  -0.20  -0.22 
  (-0.27)  (-0.23)  (-0.26)  (-0.30) 
CEO option value / total compensation  -1.83***  -1.84***  -1.94***  -1.92*** 
  (-4.11)  (-4.14)  (-4.67)  (-4.63) 
Insider shareholding (%)  0.02**  0.02**  0.01  0.01 
  (2.53)  (2.51)  (0.94)  (0.95) 
Institutional blockholdings (%)  0.02***  0.02***  0.01**  0.01** 
  (2.75)  (2.84)  (2.02)  (2.21) 
Independent audit committee dummy  -0.66***  -0.65***  -0.73***  -0.73*** 
  (-2.73)  (-2.66)  (-3.42)  (-3.43) 
Intercept -14.37*** -9.11** -13.99*** -8.85** -15.99*** -11.66*** -15.76*** -11.37*** 
 (-6.03) (-2.27) (-5.89) (-2.27) (-7.21) (-3.26) (-7.10) (-3.20) 
No. of bankruptcies 208 208 208 208 177 177 177 177 
No. of healthy firm years 8398 8377 8398 8377 7730 7713 7730 7713 
Likelihood ratio test (p value) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.567 0.607 0.570 0.610 0.405 0.452 0.406 0.454 
 
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from multi-period logit bankruptcy prediction models with alternative measures of complexity and 
specialty knowledge. LRT is the likelihood ratio test statistics between the reported model and model 2 of Table 3. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 1 
for the variable descriptions. The t-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit CNUM 
code (firm ID from CRSP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Bankruptcy prediction with matched-pairs sample 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics         
NIMTA -5.67** -6.23** -5.42* -5.45 -4.11 -3.52 -2.24 -2.16 
 (-2.12) (-1.96) (-1.71) (-1.57) (-1.48) (-1.25) (-0.83) (-0.69) 
TLMTA 3.98*** 6.94*** 7.39*** 7.95*** 3.47*** 5.69*** 5.89*** 6.48*** 
 (3.79) (5.39) (5.12) (4.70) (3.62) (4.98) (4.80) (4.96) 
CASHMTA -0.46 -1.06 -0.26 1.33 0.06 -0.35 -0.43 -0.65 
 (-0.25) (-0.47) (-0.11) (0.50) (0.03) (-0.18) (-0.22) (-0.29) 
EXRET -0.44 -0.59 -0.51 -0.34 0.08 0.02 -0.14 -0.15 
 (-1.32) (-1.55) (-1.25) (-0.81) (0.29) (0.06) (-0.47) (-0.49) 
SIGMA 6.06* 4.78 5.42 4.49 9.12*** 7.67** 8.38*** 8.08** 
 (1.74) (1.23) (1.38) (1.09) (2.96) (2.55) (2.82) (2.47) 
SIZE -1.00*** -0.73*** -0.70** -0.26 -0.97*** -0.75*** -0.68*** -0.59** 
 (-3.76) (-2.79) (-2.25) (-0.74) (-4.15) (-3.14) (-2.71) (-2.14) 
MB 0.92** 0.92** 1.08*** 0.72** 0.67* 0.69* 0.78* 0.61 
 (2.51) (2.49) (2.77) (2.03) (1.69) (1.83) (1.89) (1.51) 
PRICE -0.40 -0.26 -0.39 -0.73 -0.17 -0.13 -0.23 -0.28 
 (-1.06) (-0.69) (-0.87) (-1.57) (-0.45) (-0.33) (-0.61) (-0.68) 
Corporate Governance Variables         
Log of board size  0.17 0.58 -0.09  -0.87 -0.40 -0.75 
  (0.15) (0.51) (-0.07)  (-1.08) (-0.45) (-0.84) 
Log of board size*complexity dummy  -1.50*** -1.55*** -1.68***  -0.87*** -0.93*** -0.92*** 
  (-4.19) (-3.64) (-3.53)  (-3.47) (-3.63) (-3.33) 
Insider director fraction  0.66 1.28 0.63  0.34 1.13 0.98 
  (0.39) (0.67) (0.31)  (0.21) (0.62) (0.52) 
Insider director fraction*high R&D dummy  0.24 0.29 1.76  1.31 2.82 4.07* 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.60)  (0.63) (1.37) (1.71) 
Female director fraction   -4.21* -4.11*   -6.54*** -5.04** 
   (-1.87) (-1.79)   (-2.84) (-1.97) 
CEO/Chairman duality   0.69* 0.79**   0.74* 0.92** 
   (1.79) (1.98)   (1.81) (2.13) 
CEO shareholding (%)   -0.03* -0.08***   0.01 -0.00 
   (-1.90) (-3.64)   (0.61) (-0.21) 
CEO turnover   -0.19 -0.53   0.52 0.47 
   (-0.41) (-1.05)   (1.14) (1.06) 
CEO tenure   -0.04 -0.06   -0.03 -0.03 
   (-1.05) (-1.37)   (-0.98) (-0.85) 
Log of CEO age    0.59    -2.16 
    (0.35)    (-1.35) 
CEO option value / total compensation    -1.64**    -0.49 
    (-2.23)    (-0.86) 
Insider shareholding (%)    0.05***    0.02 
    (3.46)    (1.38) 
Institutional blockholdings (%)    0.01    -0.01 
    (1.14)    (-1.14) 
Independent audit committee dummy    -0.76*    -0.74** 
    (-1.80)    (-2.17) 
Intercept -13.04*** -9.72** -10.04** -4.81 -12.63*** -8.09* -8.50* 2.23 
 (-3.70) (-2.27) (-2.01) (-0.51) (-3.70) (-1.94) (-1.86) (0.25) 
No. of bankruptcies 216 216 216 216 185 185 185 185 
No. of healthy firm years 216 216 216 216 185 185 185 185 
Likelihood ratio test (p value)  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.620 0.655 0.672 0.705 0.478 0.512 0.548 0.568 
 
Notes: This table provides the parameter estimates from bankruptcy prediction models using matched pair sampling methods. LRT is the likelihood ratio test 
statistics between models 1 and 2, and between models 2 and 3. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 1 for the variable descriptions. The t-values reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit CNUM code (firm ID from CRSP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 9. Endogeneity Test 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Accounting ratios & other firm characteristics          
NIMTA -2.11** -2.16** -2.39* -2.43* 1.97 1.89 3.10* 3.05* 
 (-1.97) (-2.04) (-1.76) (-1.74) (1.60) (1.55) (1.69) (1.65) 
TLMTA 5.49*** 5.51*** 4.88*** 4.68*** 4.16*** 4.13*** 5.05*** 5.07*** 
 (5.82) (5.95) (4.37) (4.07) (4.85) (4.86) (4.07) (4.21) 
CASHMTA -3.21* -3.01* -3.21* -3.28* -2.36 -2.54 -0.21 -0.28 
 (-1.94) (-1.85) (-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.46) (-1.53) (-0.10) (-0.14) 
EXRET -0.58** -0.65** -0.38 -0.39 -0.07 -0.03 -0.52 -0.52 
 (-2.04) (-2.11) (-1.22) (-1.24) (-0.35) (-0.17) (-1.21) (-1.23) 
SIGMA 7.44*** 7.83*** 8.86*** 8.57*** 8.47*** 8.05*** 5.89** 5.68** 
 (4.49) (4.87) (4.54) (4.38) (5.47) (5.16) (2.45) (2.35) 
SIZE -0.83*** -0.76*** -0.85*** -0.90*** -0.89*** -0.93*** -0.43** -0.45** 
 (-5.68) (-5.02) (-5.15) (-5.34) (-6.01) (-6.19) (-2.47) (-2.40) 
MB 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.35 0.38 
  (3.70) (3.81) (3.60) (3.55) (4.24) (4.02) (1.37) (1.42) 
PRICE -0.23 -0.25 -0.29 -0.29 -0.26 -0.24 -0.40 -0.41 
 (-0.93) (-1.01) (-1.06) (-1.03) (-1.11) (-1.02) (-1.28) (-1.25) 
Corporate Governance Variables         
Log of board size (t-1) 0.24 0.33   1.29** 1.22**   
 (0.45) (0.57)   (2.56) (2.42)   
Log of board size (t-1)*complexity dummy -1.11*** -1.12***   -0.95*** -0.92***   
 (-4.52) (-4.50)   (-4.33) (-4.28)   
Insider fraction (t-1) 1.56 1.11   1.07 1.35   
 (1.12) (0.77)   (0.86) (1.10)   
Insider fraction (t-1)*high R&D dummy -2.43 -2.27   -2.25 -2.18   
 (-1.35) (-1.34)   (-1.44) (-1.38)   
Female director fraction (t-1) 0.37 0.48   1.56 1.53   
 (0.24) (0.31)   (1.15) (1.15)   
CEO/Chairman duality (t-1) 0.57** 0.57**   0.23 0.22   
 (2.18) (2.16)   (1.01) (0.95)   
CEO shareholding (%) (t-1) -0.00 -0.01   -0.00 -0.00   
 (-0.22) (-0.57)   (-0.15) (-0.17)   
CEO turnover (t-1) 0.08 0.10   -0.63* -0.62*   
 (0.24) (0.31)   (-1.70) (-1.69)   
CEO tenure (t-1) -0.03 -0.02   -0.02 -0.02   
 (-1.20) (-0.99)   (-1.09) (-0.82)   
Log of CEO age (t-1)  -0.23    -0.37   
  (-0.26)    (-0.43)   
CEO option value / total compensation (t-1)  -0.65    1.01**   
  (-1.46)    (2.29)   
Insider shareholding (%) (t-1)  0.00***    0.00   
  (3.10)    (0.85)   
Institutional blockholdings (%) (t-1)  0.01    0.00   
  (1.40)    (0.42)   
Independent audit committee dummy (t-1)  -0.29    0.02   
  (-1.12)    (0.08)   
Log of board size (t-2)   0.42 0.29   -0.05 -0.25 
   (0.75) (0.50)   (-0.07) (-0.34) 
Log of board size (t-2)*complexity dummy   -1.11*** -1.07***   -0.90*** -0.92*** 
   (-4.03) (-3.79)   (-2.66) (-2.72) 
Insider fraction (t-2)   3.08** 3.53**   -0.60 -0.91 
   (2.28) (2.48)   (-0.28) (-0.41) 
Insider fraction (t-2)*high R&D dummy   -4.49** -4.54**   -0.86 -0.69 
   (-2.25) (-2.27)   (-0.40) (-0.32) 
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Female director fraction (t-2)   1.22 1.32   -1.91 -1.78 
   (0.71) (0.76)   (-0.91) (-0.87) 
CEO/Chairman duality (t-2)   0.39 0.31   -0.16 -0.25 
   (1.43) (1.14)   (-0.50) (-0.77) 
CEO shareholding (%) (t-2)   -0.04 -0.02   -0.05 -0.04 
   (-1.22) (-0.44)   (-0.86) (-0.60) 
CEO turnover (t-2)   -0.49 -0.58   0.41 0.41 
   (-1.35) (-1.53)   (1.02) (1.01) 
CEO tenure (t-2)   -0.05** -0.05**   -0.05 -0.05* 
   (-2.06) (-2.18)   (-1.54) (-1.78) 
Log of CEO age (t-2)    0.95    1.19 
    (0.90)    (0.94) 
CEO option value / total compensation (t-2)    0.56    -0.13 
    (1.17)    (-0.23) 
Insider shareholding (%) (t-2)    -0.02    -0.02 
    (-1.54)    (-1.30) 
Institutional blockholdings (%) (t-2)    -0.00    -0.00 
    (-0.35)    (-0.15) 
Independent audit committee dummy (t-2)    -0.15    -0.66** 
    (-0.49)    (-1.98) 
Intercept -14.68*** -12.98*** -15.01*** -19.05*** -16.64*** -16.11*** -8.50*** -12.18** 
 (-6.30) (-3.19) (-5.98) (-4.03) (-7.36) (-4.05) (-2.89) (-2.16) 
No. of bankruptcies 167 167 115  112 112  53 
No. of healthy firm years 7,561 7,561 7,561  6,215 6,215  6,215 
Likelihood ratio test (p value)  <0.01    <0.01   
Pseudo R2 0.566 0.570 0.540  0.361 0.371  0.283 
 
Notes: This table provides the parameter estimates from various bankruptcy prediction models using lagged corporate governance variables. LRT is the likelihood 
ratio test statistics between models 1 and 2, and between models 2 and 3. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 1 for the variable descriptions. The t-values reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit CNUM code (firm ID from CRSP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 10. Results from Logit Regressions on Principal Components Factors 
 
 One year prior to 
bankruptcy 
Two years prior to 
bankruptcy 
Three years prior to 
bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -5.37*** -5.46*** -4.60*** -4.74*** -4.52*** -4.70*** 
 (-36.50) (-34.80) (-41.32) (-38.87) (-40.70) (-36.75) 
Accounting Factor -1.73*** -1.69*** -1.30*** -1.25*** -1.04*** -0.98*** 
 (-22.78) (-21.61) (-18.98) (-17.54) (-15.14) (-13.26) 
Corporate Governance Factor  -0.38***  -0.47***  -0.51*** 
  (-4.38)  (-6.32)  (-6.33) 
No. of bankrupt firms 217 217 186 186 130 130 
No. of non-bankrupt firms 9100 9100 8358 8358 7428 7428 
Likelihood ratio test (p value)  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
Accuracy ratio 0.454 0.464 0.242 0.265 0.142 0.174 
Pseudo R2 0.948 0.951 0.880 0.890 0.835 0.843 
 
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from logit regression on principal components factors. LRT represents the 
likelihood ratio test statistics between Models 1 and 2. The Accuracy Ratio measures the model ability to discriminate between 
bankrupt and healthy firms with a higher score indicating improved predictive ability.  The t-values reported in parentheses are 
based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit CNUM code (firm ID from CRSP). *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1. Bankruptcy Classification Rates 
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the incidence of Type I errors (classifying a bankrupt firm as healthy) and Type II errors (classifying a 
healthy firm as bankrupt) according to model scores. Model bankruptcy probabilities are ranked from lowest to highest.  For a 
given percentile, we report the frequency of Type I and Type II errors.  For example, at the 50th percentile we consider the 
incidence of Type I and Type II errors if all observations with a model bankruptcy probability above the 50th percentile are 
classified as bankrupt and all others are classified as healthy. The horizontal axis presents the cut-off point while the vertical axis 
presents the sum of Type I and Type II errors.  
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Figure 2. Results from principal components analysis 
 
 
 
 a. Non-bankrupt Firms  b. Bankrupt Firms 
      
         
 
Notes: This figure plots the average (across firms) of the principal components factors over time. Panel (a) plots the average factors for all 
non-bankrupt firms while Panel (b) does the same for all bankrupt firms. In Panel (a), the horizontal axis represents the actual year of data. 
In Panel (b), the horizontal axis represents the year relative to filing for bankruptcy.   
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Appendix 1. Hypotheses, Variables and Measurements 
 
Variable Measurement Source Hypothesized sign 
Accounting and market-based variables 
1) Profitability: The more profitable the firm, the lower the probability of bankruptcy  
 NIMTA (Net income/Market value of total assets) Compustat Negative 
    
2) Liquidity: The more liquid the firm, the lower the probability of bankruptcy 
 CASHMTA (Cash and short-term assets/Market value of 
total assets) 
Compustat Negative 
    
3) Leverage: The more leveraged the firm, the higher the probability of bankruptcy 
 TLMTA (Total liabilities/Market value of total assets) Compustat Positive 
    
4) Volatility: The more volatile the firm, the higher the probability of bankruptcy 
 SIGMA (Standard deviation of the residual derived from 
regressing monthly stock return on market return in year t) 
CRSP Positive 
    
5) Past excess return : The larger the past excess return, the lower the probability of bankruptcy 
 EXRET (Cumulative annual return in year t minus the value-
weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX return in year t) 
CRSP Negative 
    
6) Firm size: The larger the firm, the lower the probability of bankruptcy 
 SIZE (Log of the ratio of firm’s market capitalization to the 
total market capitalization of all firms) 
CRSP, Compustat Negative 
 PRICE (Log of stock price at the end of fiscal year) CRSP Negative 
    
7) Market to book ratio: It captures the relative value placed on the firm’s equity by stockholders and by accountants. 
 MB (Market value equity to book value equity) CRSP, Compustat Positive 
    
Main hypotheses 
H1: Other things being equal, complex (simple) firms are more likely to fail if they have smaller (larger) boards   
 Log(Board Size); Complexity Dummy IRRC, Proxy statements Negative for simple firms; 
Positive for complex firms 
    
H2: Other things being equal, firms whose operations require more (less) specialist knowledge are more likely to fail if they have a smaller (greater) 
proportion of inside directors 
 Insider director fraction; R&D intensity IRRC, Proxy statements, Annual 
reports 
Negative for technically 
unsophisticated firms, 
Positive for technically 
sophisticated firms 
Other corporate governance controls 
 Female director proportion IRRC, Proxy statements Negative 
 CEO serves as Chairman simultaneously Proxy statements Positive 
 The percentage of CEO ownership  Thomson Reuters Positive 
 Turnover of CEO in previous three years (dummy variable) Proxy statements Negative 
 Tenure of CEO (years) Proxy statements Uncertain 
 CEO age Compustat, Risk Metrics, Proxy 
statements, Annual reports 
Negative 
 CEO option value / total compensation Compustat, Proxy statements Negative 
 Insider shareholding (%) Compustat, Risk Metrics, Proxy 
statements, Annual reports 
Negative 
 Institutional blockholdings (%) Thomson Reuters, Annual report Negative 
 Independent audit committee dummy Risk Metrics, Proxy statements, 
Annual reports 
Negative 
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Appendix 2. Controlling for year-fixed and industry-fixed effects 
 
 One year prior to bankruptcy Two years prior to bankruptcy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Accounting ratios and other firm characteristics         
NIMTA -2.14** -2.11** -2.22** -2.28** -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 -0.19 
 (-2.19) (-2.12) (-2.23) (-2.25) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.17) 
TLMTA 4.15*** 5.74*** 5.65*** 5.81*** 3.11*** 4.46*** 4.27*** 4.52*** 
 (5.97) (7.12) (7.17) (7.07) (4.94) (5.87) (5.57) (5.99) 
CASHMTA -1.45 -2.18 -2.03 -1.50 -1.12 -1.69 -1.71 -1.37 
 (-1.08) (-1.56) (-1.47) (-1.05) (-0.87) (-1.24) (-1.33) (-0.99) 
EXRET -0.37 -0.31 -0.31 -0.32 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.14 
 (-1.32) (-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.13) (1.14) (1.24) (1.14) (0.83) 
SIGMA 6.17*** 5.86*** 5.79*** 6.26*** 8.33*** 8.01*** 8.28*** 8.62*** 
 (4.14) (3.96) (3.81) (3.88) (5.69) (5.42) (5.73) (5.77) 
SIZE -0.90*** -0.70*** -0.70*** -0.42*** -1.01*** -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.56*** 
 (-6.31) (-4.81) (-4.60) (-2.76) (-6.74) (-5.31) (-5.06) (-3.52) 
MB 0.57*** 0.68*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.58*** 0.53*** 
 (4.15) (4.73) (4.37) (3.86) (3.93) (4.41) (3.67) (3.34) 
PRICE -0.46* -0.52** -0.53** -0.71*** -0.15 -0.23 -0.22 -0.30 
 (-1.93) (-2.13) (-2.20) (-2.76) (-0.65) (-1.00) (-0.92) (-1.27) 
Corporate Governance Variables         
Log of board size  0.17 0.44 0.39  0.06 0.43 0.40 
  (0.32) (0.81) (0.68)  (0.13) (0.87) (0.79) 
Log of board size*complexity dummy  -0.94*** -0.92*** -0.97***  -0.71*** -0.72*** -0.76*** 
  (-4.41) (-4.22) (-4.19)  (-3.86) (-3.86) (-3.92) 
Insider director fraction  1.14 1.87* 1.36  1.56* 1.96** 1.56* 
  (1.10) (1.65) (1.12)  (1.92) (2.20) (1.70) 
Insider director fraction*high R&D dummy  -2.90** -3.13** -2.30*  -3.00** -2.91** -2.30* 
  (-2.03) (-2.23) (-1.71)  (-2.17) (-2.05) (-1.78) 
Female director fraction   -1.87 -1.90   -2.12 -2.42 
   (-1.20) (-1.19)   (-1.37) (-1.63) 
CEO/Chairman duality   0.53** 0.53**   0.60*** 0.67*** 
   (2.18) (2.18)   (2.81) (3.21) 
CEO shareholding (%)   0.00 -0.01   0.02 0.01 
   (0.35) (-0.84)   (1.48) (0.60) 
CEO turnover   -0.50* -0.45   -0.12 -0.05 
   (-1.80) (-1.53)   (-0.47) (-0.18) 
CEO tenure   -0.08*** -0.08***   -0.07*** -0.07*** 
   (-3.06) (-2.87)   (-3.30) (-3.37) 
Log of CEO age     -0.06     -0.05 
     (-0.08)     (-0.07) 
CEO option value / total compensation    -1.76***    -1.88*** 
    (-4.04)    (-4.71) 
Insider shareholding (%)    0.02*    0.01 
    (1.87)    (1.17) 
Institutional blockholdings (%)    0.03***    0.02*** 
    (3.34)    (2.98) 
Independent audit committee dummy    -0.40    -0.42* 
    (-1.54)    (-1.86) 
Intercept -14.20*** -11.90*** -12.26*** -8.38** -15.04*** -12.85*** -13.45*** -10.27*** 
 (-6.72) (-4.89) (-4.90) (-2.10) (-7.49) (-5.54) (-5.52) (-2.78) 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of bankruptcies 217 217 217 216 186 186 186 186 
No. of healthy firm years 9100 9100 9100 9079 8358 8358 8358 8340 
Likelihood ratio test (p value)  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.576 0.591 0.601 0.630 0.423 0.440 0.455 0.481 
 
Notes: This table presents the parameter estimates from multi-period logit bankruptcy prediction models that control for year-fixed and industry-fixed 
effects. LRT is the likelihood ratio test statistics between the reported model and model 2 of Table 3. Refer to Table 1 and Appendix 1 for the variable 
descriptions. The t-values reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the six-digit CNUM code (firm ID from 
CRSP). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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1 We wish to thank Bharat Sarath (the editor) for alerting us to this important aspect of our 
theoretical analysis. 
 
2 We also restrict the board composition data with directors serving more than 6 months within 
the fiscal year. The results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar. 
 
3 Our results remain essentially the same if we exclude firms with a SIC code from 4900 to 4999 
(regulated industries). 
 
4 We miss one observation when testing the complete set of corporate governance variables. 
 
5 The results are qualitatively similar when we account for year and industry effects in our 
empirical models. Appendix 2 reports these alternative results. 
 
6 The Pseudo and ROC curves are widely used in the bankruptcy prediction literature. See, for 
example, Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008). 
 
7 One might argue that creditor control could also be associated with bankruptcy risk. Parker et al. 
(2002) measure two proxies including creditor ownership and the presence of a troubled debt 
restructuring. Their results indicate that these two variables are not significantly related to the 
survival likelihood of distressed firms.  
 
8  We further interact firm complexity and need for specialty knowledge and find that the 
negative effects of CEO turnover and CEO tenure are stronger when firms are more complex and 
need more specialty knowledge. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
9  One possible reason for the positive relationship between institutional blockholding and 
bankruptcy risk, which is inconsistent with our expectation, is that bankrupt firms tend to be 
smaller and the percentage of shares owned by institutional blockholders are relatively high. 
 
10 We further test the models using various alternative cutoffs and find that the results continue to 
hold. 
 
11 Number of citations per patent applied for in year t by firm i with citations of each patent 
adjusted for truncation bias following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). We scale citations of a 
given patent by the average number of citations received by all patents in that year in the same 
technological class as the patent. 
 
12 Alternatively, we retest the model by assuming no effect of firm’s financial status on CEO 
turnover or corporate governance variables. Thus, we restrict the sample to be without any CEO 
turnover between year t-2 to t or to have no change in other corporate governance variables. The 
regressions results from these additional sub-samples do not alter our conclusions deduced from 
Table 9. 
